Changes brought in by Bill 99 (Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1998) limited coverage for mental health injuries to workers who had experienced traumatic mental stress. As a result, the WSIB does not accept any mental stress conditions that emerge over time. Despite a finding by the Workplace Safety and Appeals Tribunal that it was unconstitutional and discriminatory to exclude chronic mental injuries from compensation, workers continue to be denied coverage, with their only option to engage in a multi-year, costly and stressful appeals process.
THE WSIB says injured workers are doing better than ever. This document challenges the spin being placed on the Board’s “performance improvements” and cost reductions, achieved on the backs of injured workers.
Experience rating (ER), a financial incentive program for employers used by the WSIB to promote occupational health and safety, is not achieving its goals but instead hurts injured workers in many ways. Employer resources are diverted from workplace safety improvement towards claims management and suppression (discouraging the reporting of accidents and filing of workers’ claims). ER programs also fail in supporting successful return to work. Proposed changes look at insurance equity rather than the addressing the core problems with the program.
Phantom jobs, phantom wages… Instead of looking at what the injured worker is actually able to earn in suitable and available employment, the Board deems (or dreams) most injured workers to have returned to full time gainful employment after their injury, regardless of their real life situation… and then reduces or eliminates their loss of earnings benefits by this deemed wage. Backgrounder also discusses the threat to remove the 72-month lock-in of benefits, without which injured workers will find themselves under “perpetual probation”.
A summary of the developments and funding/cost-cutting rationale leading up to the Board’s implementation of new benefits policies; with analysis of the general approach under decision makers ‘look to deny’ by questioning work relatedness every step of the way. The main way this is achieved is by repeatedly raising the issue of pre-existing conditions. Backgrounder discusses how these policies reject the legal principles (including the thin skull doctrine) and instead try to ‘medicalize’ the decision-making process through not only challenging causation but use of “expected recovery times” – rather than individualized assessment – as a tool to cut off benefits. (Originally published in Justice For Injured Workers Jan. 2015 issue).
The four key demands of the injured workers movement, and key provisions from the 2004 Platform for Change document (summary of draft revision)
In response to a statement in the Legislature, statistics from 2004-2013 show that cost of living adjustments for compensation benefits have in fact not kept pace with inflation – in real value they have shrunk by 9.6%.
Key findings from the ONIWG Injured Workers and Poverty Survey 2010/2011.
Almost 30% of Ontario’s workers are not covered. Who is not covered, and why it matters.
On eve of the Funding Review, this paper asks if the concern about the Board’s “unfunded liability” is a smokescreen for reducing compensation benefits to keep low rates for employers? A detailed look at the unfunded liability, funding options and alternatives to reducing benefits and services. Paper compares the government’s treatment of injured workers in times of recession, with cuts to cost of living adjustments that reduced the value of benefits by almost 30%, while employers’ rates were reduced and rebates increased. As the WSIB’s own data showed, if employers’ assessment rates had simply been kept at the 1996 level, by the year 2006 there would have been no unfunded liability.